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IN "'HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----------00000----------

HAGGIS MANAGEMENT, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

v.

TURTLE MANAGEMENT, INC.,
JEOFFREY MEACHAM, STEPHEN
McCAUGHEY and DAN LEE BRIGGS,

Case No.

19017

Defendants-Respondents.
----------00000---------NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of an order granting a summary judgment in
favor of Respondents, dismissing Appellant's complaint against
three guarantors for the balance due under a secured promissory
note.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant sued the principal debtor, Turtle Management,
Inc., and three guarantors, to recover the balance due under a
promissory note.

The note was secured by collateral comprised of

all of the assets of a private club and restaurant known as The
Haggis.

A default judoment was entered against the principal

debtor and it subsequently declared bankruptcy.

The Respondents

answered and defended claiming, among other things, that the
Appellant was barred from recovering a deficiency judgment

against them because the Appellant

0•

r0quireJ tr

collateral in a commercially re2sonablP mannPr.
discovery, which included interrogatories, depositions, extensive
memoranda and oral argument, the Trial Court enterpd its order
granting Respondents' Motion for
the complaint.

Judgment and dismissed

Pursuant to stipulation, an Amended Surnrrary

Judgment was entered, certifying the 1udgment as final in
accordance with the provisions of RulP 54(d) of the Utah Pules of
Civil Procedure.

Appellant now appeals the Trial Court's

granting of that suJT'JTiary judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the Trial Court's
Summary Judgment dismissing Appellant's ccmpli'lint and an award of
Pespondents rosts incurred in correction with this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's Statement of FactB is, in substantial part,
a superficial and, at times, an in<'lccurate recitation of the
relationship between the parties to this action.
collaterall::" does the

Only

discuss the undisp11ted material

:"acts that were the founc1Ation of the Trial Cnurt'c: summar'!
judgment.

While the Appellant makes a number of bare

contentions, only one conclusion m2v be drawn from th0
undisputec1, material facts surrounding the

and

disposition of the collateral -- it was commercially unreasonable
as a matter of law.
On July 7, 1978, Turtle Management, Inc., purchased a
restaurant and private liquor club, doing business as "The
Haggis", from the Appellant.

The promissory note executed by

Turtle Management, Inc., and guaranteed by Respondents Meacham,
Mccaughey and Briggs (RECORD pg. 6, 8-10), was secured by an
agreement which, in part, provided:
Securitv for the Note.
As security for the payment of
the unpaid part of the purchase price as evidenced by
the Note, the Buyer hereby grants to Seller a security
interest in Purchaser's furniture, fixtures, equipment,
inventory, accounts receivable and proceeds therefrom.
To
further
evidence
such
security
interest,
the
parties, concurrently with the execution hereof, shall
execute a security agreement in the form attached
hereto as Exhibit
• F"
(the •Security Agreement•)
vesting
in
the
Seller
such
security
interest.
[Emphasis added.] (RECORD pg. 12)
The security agreement granted the Appellant
a security interest in and to the collateral
described on Exhibit "A" hereto which is incorporated
herein by reference, which collateral is now owned or
hereafter may be acquired by the debtor; the proceeds,
increases, products of such collateral; accessions
thereto; and anv propertv which the debtor may receive
on account of such collateral .
[Emphasis added.]
(RECORD pg. 16)
The Appellant incorrectly states the promissory note was
secured "only by the equipment and furniture" on the premises
(Appellant's Brief, page 3).

The promissory note was secured by

virtually every item of tangible or intangible property used by
or located in the business sold to the Respondents.

Exhibit "A"

to the Security Agreement included all fixtures, decorations,

paintings, Mirrors,

signs,

light

hr1r

'",t,·r,lr,

ch?irs, brass rails, safP, rugs, the spittnor1, stuff0d

stereo, antique bar, sinks, ice hins, metal storaae

JUice

mixers, curtains, plants, booths, tahles, dishwashers,
racks, piano, blenders, brass boarders, grill, ovens, vent and
hood system, sandwich counter, meat cutter, broilers, fryers,
freezers, cassettes, walk-in refrigerators, storage bins,
silverware, glasses and even the knives and forks.
"E" to Deposition of Terrell Wesley Smith.)

(See Exhibit

The Appellant sold

the entire business and, pursuant to the security agreement,
repossessed the entire business; not just equipment and
furniture.
The total sales price of the business was $350,000, of which
$300,000 was represented to be the net worth of the hard assets
(fixtures, furniture, equipment, inventory, accounts)
to be the value of the going business concern.
Jeoffrey Meacham, p.29-30].

and $50,000

[Deposition of

Appellant received a cash

payment of $100,000 and 22 monthly payments of $4,950,

for a

total cash paid of $208,900 up to the date of Turtle Management's
default.
The Appellant also received a guaraf'tl"P nf the promissnrv
note executed by Respondents, under which they Jointly and
severally guaranteed to Appel!ant the payment of the prnmissorv
note signed by Turtle Manaqement.

4

(RECORD pg.

8)

Turtle Management operated the business until July, 1980,
when business conditions forced its closure and the subsequent
filing for the liquidation in the bankruptcy court (In re: Turtle
Management, Inc., United States Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah, Case No. 80-01829.)
ceased.

Payments upon the promissory note

This lawsuit was filed July 29, 1980.

(RECORD pg.

2)

In August, 1980, the Appellant repossessed the business
premises and, with minor exceptions, all property covered under
the security agreement.
Wesley Smith, pg. 34)

(RECORD pg. 260; Deposition of Terrell
The Trustee of Turtle Management's

bankruptcy recognized the security agreement and repossession by
abandoning the bankruptcy estate's interest in all assets
comprising The Haggis Club and Restaurant.
On September 8, 1980, and on October 13, 1980, the
Respondents filed their Answers to the Complaint alleging, among
other things, the Appellant's duty to dispose of the repossessed
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner.

(RECORD pg. 26,

41)
In October, 1980, the Appellant disposed of the business and
all of its assets to Eelsew, an unincorporated association of the
principals of the Appellant, Steve Strasser; Howard Landa, an
attorney; Terrell Smith, an attorney; and John Landon.

The

Appellant receivPd no consideration for this transfer (RECORD pg.
255), gave no not ice to Respondents or the public and did not
advertise the assets as being for sale.

5

In January, 1981, the businPsS and its ilcc•'ts \H'r"
disposed of, this time to FelsPW,

Inr., a

""·11'1

'.. l"'s""

officers and shareholders were those sarnP principals.

thP

1'.ppellant received no consideration, gave no not ire to the
Respondents or the public and conducted no advance advertisino of
the sale.
The Appellant admits the August,

1980, repossession o• the

business was because of Turtle Management's default upon the note
and security agreement

[Deposition of Howard Landa, p.5SJ;

that

the business and its assets were conveyed without consideration
to Eelsew, the unincorporated association

[Deposition of John

Pranklin Landon, p.19-20; Deposition of Howard Landa, p.56];

that

Felsew's entire interest in the repossessed business and property
was then assigned to EelsPW, Inc.

[Deposition of Hnward Lc>nda,

p.55]; and, that this convevance was a private sale of which
Turtle Management and the guarantors were given no notire
[Deposition of Howard Landa, p.56, p.63]

It is also admitted

that Eelsew, Inc., the corpor2tion, was, 1.•ith the <>xceptinn rif
Howard

operated by the same prinripals as the Appellant

[Deposition of John Pranklin Landon,
Eelsew, Inc., 0peri'lted the club and res'=r>urant urc"il 0uly,
1Q81, when the same business and

were aoain trans•crrcd

and sold, a third time, t0 Chianti Marc?oemen'=
anothPr Utah c0rporation,

for 5110,000.

( PEC()FJ; r,a.

was no allocatior. of the $110 ,onn purrh,1sc pricP ""

Inr.,

:' (, i

I

en1i1pm0nt,

leasehnld imprnvements, goodwill, etc.

(RECORD pg.

No notice of this private sale or of the other two
previous private sales was aiven to the Respondents

(RECORD pg.

264), even though this lawsuit was pending and each guarantor had
formally appeared and was represented by counsel known to the
Appellant.

None of the three sales had the benefit of

advertisement, public notice, or solicitation of offers to
purchase.

(RECORD pg. 2 6 fi)

Appellant admits that, with a few minor exceptions, it
repossessed the same business and assets originally sold to
Turtle Management [Deposition of Terrell Wesley Smith, pg.34].
While the business required some rehabilitation in the form of
cleaning and painting, primarily painting [Deposition of John
Franklin Landon, lines 7 and 8, pg .19] , no basic changes were
made to the business or its assets before any of the three sales.
Appellant's Brief alleges it expended approximately $80,000
in rehabilitation of the premises.

(page 7)

However, the record

establishes only $34,000 in rehabilitation costs [RECORD pg.353],
and Appellant admits certain capital improvements were performed
at the time of repossession and that the

includes both

improvements and clean-up [Deposition of Terrell Wesley Smith,
pg.26-27].
improvement

Appellant is unable to allocate the cost of
the cost of clean-up though it has conceded that

the business onlv required a general cleaning and painting.

same business ancl the same assets it h2c' 0riqinull;· "'Id

t0

r.411

Turtle Management [Deposition 0f TerrPll

that the promissory note was secured by the entire business and
its assets.

Most important, however,

is the Appellant's

admission that the hard assets which it repossrssed had a
rerlacement value of between $400,000 and $500,000

[Deposition of

Terrell Wesley Sr.iith, pg.36,37].
Rased upon the forPqoinq, Respondents made Motions for
Sumrnary Judgment on the grnunds that, under these undisputed
facts, Appellant was barred !rom recoverinq a deficiency judgment
against the guarantors.

Those Motions were granted.

l\rpelL'lnt

then filed a Supplemental Motion to Vacate Sumrnap; Judament.
(RECORD pg. 378-379)

The content of that motion is clearly

demonstrative of Appellant's unreasonable handling of the
collateral.

The following excerpt reveals that Appellant was

to and could do almost anything with the collateral, ever
though title to the same had changed hancls three times .
. on the further grounds that Plaintiff can arrange
to reassume possessi0n and ownership of the collateral
or its proceeds which is the subject mat•er nf the
Security Agreement.
Plaintiff moves this Court that
reasonable manner within 30 days.

a

sale

bP

held

in

i'1

As grounds for this
Plaintiff stcit0s tha'= it
can obtain the collateral for sa 1 o to protect thP
Defendants' interest.
'l'hR collat0r0l is nnt thP type
to have diminished in _v_a_l_u_e__a_n_d-,--1-·n_ _f_a_c_t_,--ma-..-,-h-,a.........\,-'-e
increased in value.

ordering the sale nf the col lateral the rights of
the Defendants will hP prn+Prted and no prejudice can
result from this
B'.i

In the alternative Plaintiff states that there has been
a mistake and apparPntly the collateral has not been
"sold" by the Plaintiff and, therefore, the Summary
Judgment was improper
[Emphasis added]
(RECORD pg.
378-379).
A copy of the Supplemental Motion has been included in the
Appendix to this Brief.

That Supplemental Motion was properly denied by the Trial
Court.

Appellant now appeals the granting of Summary Judgment.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
IF THE SALE OF COLLATERAJ OCCURS WITHOUT NOTICE
TO THE DEBTOR AND IS COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE,
THE SECURED PARTY MAV NOT RECOVER A DEFICIENCY.
A secured party's duties in disposing of collateral are set
forth in Section 70A-9-504 (3)

Utah Code Ann.,

(1953).

This

Court, in FMA Financial Corp. ''· Pro-Printers, Inc., 590 P.2d 803
(Utah, 1977), restated that st,,tute,
important requirements

in part, and emphasized its

to a disposition of collateral:

Disposition of collateral may be by public or private
proceedings and ma v be made bv wa v of one or more
contracts.
Sale or. other disposition may be as a unit
or in parcels and at any time and place and on any
terms but everv aspect of the disposition including the
method,
manner,
time,
place
and
terms
must
be
rommerciallv reasonable.
. reasonable notification
•he time and place of an" public sale or reasonable

9

notification of the timP aftPr which an" pn'"'"P s,11•'
0r other intended disposition is to Lf' rr,,-,dr chzillTJP
sent bv the secured partv to thP debtor .
590
at 806 citing §70A-9-504 (3) Utah Code Ann.,
'All emphasis is supplied by thP Court.]
Likewise, the duties imposPd en the secured creditor by this
section are owed '10t only to the principal debtor hilt: also to any
guarantors of the obligation.
Hurst, 570 P.2d 1031

Zion's First

Bank v.

(Utah, 1977), FMA Financial Corp., supra.

In granting Summary JudgmPnt, the Trial Court was reauired
to analyze the pertinent provisions 0f the Utah Uniform
Commercial Code as interpreted by this Court.

It also considered

the following undisputed acts of Appellant in disposing of the
collateral.
July 1980 - Turtle defaults
July 28, 1980 - Complaint filed
August 1980 - Appellant repossesses collateral,
including the business, leasehold improvements, furniture,
fixtures, eauipment and inventory.
September 8, 1980 - Mccaughey and Briggs Answer filed
alleging collateral must be
disposed of reasonablv
October 13, 1980 -

Answer filPd
alleqjng collateral must be
disposed o:: reasonabl"

* * * * *
October 2 8 , 198 O
F'IPST TRANSFFF

Haggis, Inc., transfers club and
assets to Eelsew fan asscciatic'1
of thP princip<1ls of Haqai'.o, Ir.c. I
transfer had:

l0

(1) NO consideration;
(2) NO advertising;
(3) NO notice to guarantors
or their counsel.
January 23, 1981
SECOND TRANSFER

Eelsew transfers club and assets
to Eelsew, Inc. (a Utah corporation incorporated January 23,
1981)
This transfer had:
(1) NO consideration;
(2) NO advertising;
(3) NO notice to guarantors
or their counsel.

July 2 2, 19 81
THIRD TRANSFER

Eelsew, Inc., transfers club and
assets to Chianti, Inc. (a Utah
corporation). This transfer had:
(1) a $110,000 purchase price;
(2) NO advertising;
(3) NO notice to guarantors
or their counsel.

The end result of that analysis was the Trial Court's correct
conclusion that these actions, when considered cumulatively, and
in conjunction with §70A-9-504 (3), Utah Code Ann.,

(1953),

constituted a commercially unreasonable disposition of the
collateral as a matter of law.
Appellant's first argument appears to be that §70A-9-507(1)
Utah Code Ann. ,

(19 5 3)

,

which al lows a debtor to seek damages

from the secured creditor in the event of a commercially
unreasonable sale, is the exclusive remedy for a debtor against a
creditor who has not complied with the provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code.

This position is simply not supported by the

cases which have interpreted this section of the Code.

11

In FMA

Financial Corp.

I

supra, the trinl r:nurt

the creditor a deficiency judgment.

()n appeal,

-ln

tht-·

-,r,l1'r

dr>n'!1 nn

r·rr1..:ilt-0r

asserted that the exclusive remed;· nf the debt0r was tr·,
damages.

This Court disagreed with the crPditor, affirmea the

trial court, and stated:
Although the Uniform Commercial Code dces not expressly
providP for the fol lowing r<"mPdy, many courts r_a•re hP 1 c"
the secured party may nbtain no deficienry from the
creditor if it fails to give the debtor ;:-f•asonable
notice.
[footnote]
Other courts have held +:hat the
debtor's exclusiv<" remedy is set nut in Article 9.
If the disposition has occurrf'd, the
debtor or any person entitled to not:fication
. has a right tn rf'couer from the srcured
party any loss caused by the failurP to
comply with
the
provision
of
this
part
[citing
§70A-9-507(1)
Utah
Code
Ann.,
( 19 5 3) l .

While we noted thP existPnce of the abO'.'e sf'ction in
Zion's First National Bank v. Hurst, supra notP. 7
"-'"
do not believe it to be the dP.btor's Pxclusive remedy.
Id. at 807.
In spitP. of Appellant's claim, that decisinn was in no wa:·
affected bv this Court's derision in Utah Bank and Trust v.
Quinn, 622

'.'93

(Utah,

19RO),

inasmuch as the opin.i.nn did nnt

deal with the statute relied upon by Appellant.

Tr,

short, thP

lew in Utah presently allows a debtor to SUP a c;:-rditnr fnr
connected with imprrppr coll3teral disprs't1on but that
is a remedv separate 2nd apart
not a

creditor

r.i0y

the

i::ecover. a

of whrthPr nr
ludgm0nt

debtor when the creditor has not fol!owed thP rules orescrihrd
for him by the Unjf0rm CommP.rcial Code.

1 "

a

Tr 1•s Prief, Appellant appears to argue that the sole basis

tnr the Tried r:onrt' s decision barrino a deficiency against
Respondents was the undisputed fact that no notice of any of the
dispositions of the collateral was given to the guarantors.

In

making that argument, Appellant chooses to ignore the other facts
which the Trial Court chose not to ignore, namely: the number of
transfers; the absence of consideration; the lack of public
advertising; the failure to solicit bids; and the private nature
of each of the three transfers.

In short, Appellant claims the

Trial Court adopted a "no notice, no deficiency" rule and, in so
doing, misinterpreted the line of decisions handed down by this
Court.

Such is simply not the case as is evidenced by analysis

of the applicable Utah cases.
The question of the propriety of a deficiency judgment in a
case such as this has been addressed many times by this Court.
The following historical analysis of those cases demonstrates and
supports the proposition that at the very minimum if no notice of
a disposition of collateral is given and if the sale is
commercially unreasonable, then the secured party may not recover
a deficiency.
In Zion's First National Bank, supra, Plaintiff, the secured
creditor,

failed to give notice to the Defendant, a personal

guarantor of the obliqatinn, of the sale of the certain
col lateral.

Defendant claimed that failure to so notify

precluded the Plaint1•f from <:>btaining any deficiency judgment

13

2gainst him.
niven the Defendant notice, but stated
. The usual rule is
failure to sc notify docs
not release the debtor frnm any deciciency
ric1y
arise; but upon such failure he rnciy get credit fnr (or
recover) only fnr any loss caused by the c2ilure tn so
notify.
Id. at 1033, 1034.
The Court cited §70Jl-9-507 Utah Code Ann.,

(1953), as authnrit.y

fnr this conclusion and upheld the deficiency.
This Court subsequently modified Zion's First Natinnal Bank,
supra, in FMA Financial Cnrporation, supra.

In this ccise, the

Defendant-debtor orally requested the Plaintiff, secured
creditor, to take the equipment and sell it.

Plaintiff did take

the equipment, stnred it in a garage for eight months and without
notifying Defendant, eventually sold the equipment.

The Court

stated that even though the Defendant had requested Plaintiff to
pick up and sell the equipment, this, in no way, constituted a
waiver of Defend2nt's right to notice of the time and nature of
the dispnsition.

Id. at 807.

The Court then stated that:

. The purpose of the notice requirement is for the
protection of the debtor, by perrnittinq him to bid at
the sale, or arrange for interested parties to bid, and
to otherwise assure that thP sale is conducted in 2
commercially reasonable manner.
The danger resulting
from not notifving the debtor of the sa i_c cf secured
property is that the property may he sold for an amount
unreasonably below its market value, burdeninq the
debtor with liabilitj• for the deficiency.
Id.
In holding for the Defendant, the Court concluded that:
Because F!',A
did not cnnduct
manner,
it is
judgment. Id. at

did not give the required notice, crnd
the sale in a commerciall•; reasonable
barred from obtaining i
deficienc"
808.
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Althnugh the Court never so stated, the definite implication of
this decision was that if a secured party did not give notice of
a sale of collateral to the debtor, it is barred from obtaining a
deficiency judgment.
Then, in Utah Bank and Trust, supra, this Court discussed a
refined position on the no notice, no deficiency rule.

In that

case, a father guaranteed certain obligations of his son which
were secured by "exotic" cars.

When the son defaulted, the

father agreed that the Bank could place the cars on used car lots
to be sold individually.

The cars were advertised in local

newspapers and the father even signed off on some of the titles
when requested to do so.
and a deficiency resulted.

The proceeds were applied to the debt
The father challenged the deficiency

on the grounds of no notice and commercial unreasonableness in
disposing of the collateral, but, under those facts, this Court
upheld the deficiency and discussed in depth the manner in which
§70A-9-504 (3),

has been applied.

The Court first noted the following three positions as to
the effect of failure to give notice under the Comr.1ercial Code.
1.

Where there is no notice, there can be no deficiency

judgment.
2.

Failure to give notice puts the burden of proof on the

creditor to show that the sale of collateral took place in a
commercially reasonable manner.

l5

presnmption arises that the collateral had a ''illue P<1ucil tn, n1
greater than, the debt.

Id. at 796.

In Utah Bank and Trust, supra, the Court hPld, under the
facts of that casP, the "no notice, no deficienC'/" r11le was not
applicable, but noted that in FMA Financial Corp., surra, ev<'n
though no notice was given to the debtor, the decision not to
grant a deficiency judgment was also based on the fact that sale
of the collateral was not conducted in a commercially reasonable
manner and that there was evidence that the collaterill was of a
value equal to, or greater than, the debt.

Id. at 796.

In any

event, Appellant's reliance on Utah Bank and Trust, supra, is
misplacecl given the fact differences between that case anc the
case presentlv before the Court.
After Utah Bank and Trust, supra, this Court in the C?'P of
Strevell Paterson Co., Inc. v. Francis, fi46 P. 2d 741

(Utah,

1982), eli'borated in dicta the significance of thP h0lding ir FMA
Financial Corp., supra, and the irnportancP of the notice
requirement irnposPd upon the creditor -- especiallv in cases of
privatP sales.
In Pro-Printers [FMJI. Financial], we barred a defirier<c"'
judgment against guarantors where the creditor
had repossessed the secured pr0pertv ar.c sole it at a
private sale in a mannPr which was not corrcrnerri2ll"
reasonable.
The creditor had
fai!ed
to give
th0
auarantors
notification
of
the
salP,
m.1kina
it
impossible for them to protect their subrogat:on riqhts
and other intPcest in the outrornP of thcThP
rule in Pro-Printers defines thP dutiPs
cr0di to;=-;;
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who

U'possess

added l .

col lateral.

Id.

at

743.

[Emphasis

In the case presently before the Court, there were three
private sales and the guarantors were not notified of any.
Consequently, "it was impossible for them to protect their
subrogation rights and other interests in the outcome of the
sale[s]".

Id.

[Brackets added]

The Appellant relies extensively upon Clark Leasing
Corporation v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451,
535 P.2d 1077

(1975), claiming that Utah Bank and Trust,

supra,

and the "vast majority of states" adopted the rule pronounced in
Clark Leasing, supra.

That case points out the Uniform

Commercial Code's two requirements in the disposition of
collateral after a repossession:

The first is that notice be

given to the debtor; and the second is that the sale must be
commercially reasonable in all respects, including method,
manner, time, place and terms.

Both of these requirements are

meant to see that a reasonable price is received for the
collateral and to protect the debtor against any unfairly low
price.

Likewise, the holdings in those cases are not contrary to

the Trial Court's decision in this case.
Most recently, this Court in Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., v.
Glaubensklee, 649 P.2d 88

(Utah, 1982), reversed the trial

court's entry of a deficiency Judgment for the creditor and held
as a matter of law that where there was not a commercially

1

reasonab]e sale then the creditor is not Pntitled tn

judgment.

3

Jpcici 0 nr:•

This Court succinctly stated:

Because the sale in thP instant case was not ccrducted
in a commercially reasonable rnanrer,
is
barred from obtaining a def ic iPnC'i judgment.
:::d. at
31.
The issue then becomes:

"Was the sale, or more

were the sales commercially unreasonable as a matter of law given
the fact that Appellant has admitted that no notice of any of the
three transfers of the collateral was ever given to the
Respondents?"

POINT II
APPELLANT'S DISPOSITION OF THE COLLATERAL
IN QT!ESTION WAS C'OMMERCIALLY UNREASONARLE
AS A MA'l"C'F:R OF LAW
In spite of the arguments contained in Appellant's Brief,
its disposition of the collateral in question was
unreasonable as a matter of law.

It is undisputed that Appellant

did not give any notice of the three transfers of the collateral;
it is also undisputed that it did not advertise any oc the three
transfers and it received no consideration for either of the
two transfers.
Of most importance is the fact that the Appellant itself has
admitted the unreasonahle nature of thP

of thP

collateral when it requested the following of the Trial Court in
its Supplemental Motion to VAcilte Surnmarv JudgmPnt
389-379; see also Appendix to this Brief)
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a

Plaintiff moves th:s court that
reasonablP manner within 30 days.

sale be held
[Emphasis

in a

Section 7QA-9-504 ( 3), supra, imposes two obligations and one
restriction on the secured creditor.

First he must notify the

debtor of any intended disposition of the collateral.

In this

case, it is admitted that no notice was given to any of the
guarantors or their counsel of

of the three sales.

Secondly,

the secured party must be certain that everv aspect of the
disposition be commercially reasonable.

Third, while a secured

party may purchase the collateral at a public sale, he may not
buy at a private sale unless the collateral is of such nature as
to allow its value to be easily ascertainable.
. The secured party may buy at any public sale and
if the collateral is of a type customarily sold in a
recognized market or is of a type which is the subject
of widely distributed standard price quotations he may
buy at a private sale.
Id.
The commercially reasonable public sale of §70A-9-504,
supra, was recently defined by this Court in Pioneer Dodge,
supra:
A public sale after default "has traditionally
meant 'a sale in which the public, upon proper notice,
is invited to participate and given full opportunity to
bid upon a competitive basis for the property placed on
sale,
which
is
sold
to
the
highest
bidder.'"
(Citations)
The
requirement of a public
invitation is essential for a public sale under the
Uniform Commercial Code.
(Citations)
It is
fundamental that a public sale presupposes postino
public notices or advertising.
(Citations)
. The
Restatemert of Security §48 comment (1941) defines a
public sale as "one to which the public is invited bv
advertisement to 'lppear and bid at auction for
gnods to be sold".

; Q

Presumably the essence of a 'public salP' 10that the relevant public is rot onlv invited
to ?.ttend but is also infnrme<i, !:l'.'
means of publicity m<'ly be appropr ;_rite, whPr.
and where the sale is tn bP held.
If tre
sAle has not been
puhlicized,
it would not be a public sale no matter where
it was held er
it was conducted.
Id. At
30.
[Emphasis added]
In Pioneer Dodge, supra, the secured part'.' aa 11e notice of
the intended sale to the debtor and then took the collateral, a
truck, to five or six other dealers and obtained oral bids.
was also offered to wholesalers.

It

Several davs later, it

announced over a loudspeaker at its place of business that the
sale of the truck was about to take place at auction.
secured party bought the truck.

The

In reversing a deficiency

judgment against the debtor as a matter of law, this Court held:
These efforts did not aive reasonable notice to that
part of the public which would likely be interested in
the sale.
Id. at 31.
It is also interesting to note that the Court in this case citec
FMA Financial Corp., supra, with approval and barred the
deficiency judgment solely on the grounds that the sale was
conducted in a commerciall;• unreasorable manner.
It is impnssible to conceive how arv nf the three transfrrs
made by Appellant were done under the auspices of a commerciall::
reasonable sale.
Reggis,

The transfers of the club and its

Inc., to Eelsew, er. association,

corporation, and

thPr. tr EelsAw,

from
Inc.,?

Chianti, Inc., entities sPparate and

distinct from Appellant, were ccwo1d of

;_ 0

,. 0

t ice.

the three guarantors or •hpir counsel received any notice of any
of the threP d1sposit1ons.
opportun1tv for,

There were no invitations to, nor

the general public to bid competitively.

Moreover, the first two transfers were made without
consideration, surely an element of any commercially reasonable
sale -- public or private.

One cannot argue that the sale

without consideration of the club and its assets from Appellant
to Eelsew to Eelsew, Inc., comports with commercial
reasonableness, when, but two years earlier, Appellant had sold
the club to Turtle Management, Inc., for $350,000.

It is now not

justifiable to allow Appellant to claim that these transfers were
only for convenience inasmuch as the title to the club and assets
passed by virtue of the transactions thereby diluting, if not
entirely eliminating, any chance of the Respondents to protect
their rights in the collateral.
The third transfer from Eelsew, Inc., to Chianti, Inc, was,
as with the others, made without notice to the Respondents and
without benefit of advertisement or public auction.

Appellant,

like the creditor in Pioneer Dodge, supra, did not give notice to
that part of the general public who might be interested in the
purchase of restaurant and private club equipment.

In fact,

Appellant did not formally solicit bids from anyone but Chianti,
Inc.
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thereby exc 1 uding any other

prospective buyers who could have increased the bidding price.

A commercially reasonable public '"'1le is

to e>ns'rcP

a proper disposition of the assets at a fair and corrl'r• price as
was stated in FMA Financial Corp., supra:
The purpose of the notice requirement io, :or the
protection of the debtor, by perl!'itting hi!11 to bid at
the sale, or arrange for interested partiPS to bid, and
to otherwise assure thAt the sale is
in a
commerciall1' reasonable manner.
Thf' danger resultir.9
from not nntifvinq the debtor of the Sa lP of secured
property is thi{t thf' property may be sold for ar 2!1lourt
unrPasonably below its markPt value, burdeninn the
debtor with liability for the deficiency.
Ironicallv,
the notice requirement acts to the secured party's
advantage; if the df>htor helps secure a hiqhP r sale
price the securPd party is bPnefittPd, becausf' thP
p:i:-ospect of
recovering
2 r.:'
deficiency
is
usu a 11"
dubious.
Id. at 807.
Appellant's refusal tn qive Respondents or an'.' part of the
general public or the business community an

to bid en

thP assets was in direct violation of the standards imposed by
Pionef'r Dodge, supra, and, therefore, commercially unrPasorahle
as a matter of law.
Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Ann.,

(1953), also pPrrnits

e>

secured party to purchase collateral at a privatP sale but onlv
if the collateral is of a type customarily sole' ir a recognized
market or of a type which is the subject of widely distributed
standard price quotations.

This is for the protection cf the

debtor to assure arm's-length transactions in the sale of the
collateral and to permit the debtor to tPst the fairness of the
sAle by comparison of thP price paid by the secured partv to
standard price auotations.

The characterization of collatPrnl as

of a type customarily sold in a recognized

nr the suh·0rt

of widely-distributed, standard-price quotations cannot apply to
dn ongoing business of a private liquor club.

Even Appellant

ndmits in its Brief, page 16, that a private club is an unusual
item "much like the exotic cars in Utah Bank and Trust v. Quinn
Appellant also admits that Eelsew and Eelsew, Inc., were
associations of the Appellant's principals and that the
collateral was privately transferred to those associations.
The facts of this case are very similar to the facts of
Jackson State Bank v. Beck, 577 P.2d 168 (Wyo., 1978), where the
Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's summary judgment
barring a secured creditor's claim for a deficiency judgment.

In

that case, the Bank gave notice to the debtor that it intended to
conduct a private sale of the automobiles it had earlier
repossessed.

Thereafter, the Bank consummated the sale by making

an entry on its books that $50,000 had been applied as a credit
towards the principal obligation.

The Bank then concluded it

could not legally enter into the automobile business and,
therefore, transferred the collateral to a corporation formed and
managed by two officers of the Bank.

The collateral was

ultimately liquidated in that business for $18,000.
In holding for the debtor, the Court noted that the critical
issue was whether or not the secured creditor had complied with
the requirements of §34-21-963 (c) W.S.A,
Utah Code Ann.

(1977),

(1953) I regardless of its motive.

[§70A-9-504 (3)
It concluded

that it had J"'Ot because of thP wav it:

disposed

,,c

collateral.
we would make the point t:hat a sPrured rrPdi tr;r 1-'ho
purchas"s the collateral from hiroself, unlcs" hP r,1n
bring
himself
within
the
"recognized
f'12rkPt"
or
"standard price quotation" exceptions, i.s in thr> same
direct violation of the requirements of the statut" as
is the creditor who fails to aive notice.
Id. at 170.
In the case beforA this Court, Appellant did not aiv" notice
as was donA in Jackson State Bank, supra.

It

transfr>rrPd the

"unique" collateral privately twice unilaterally gi,.·ing
Responde!"'ts a credit of approximately $30,000 on the prinripal
debt.

It then sold privately to a third person again without

notice to Respondents all in violation of §70A-9-504 (31, supra.
In suI1lI!lary, the reason the Trial Court concludPd that
Appellant's disposition of the collateral was co!T1JT1ercially
unr,,asonable as a matter of law was that thP Pppellant did
absolutely nothing it was required to do, either under the
Commercial Code or under the cases of this Court, interprPting
those provisions.

It did not give notice to any of the

guarantors or their counsel; it privately transferred the
collateral, which was unique in nature, first to Eelsew, the
association, then to Eelsew, Inc., the corporation, and then,
finally, to Chianti, Inc., a corporation;

it did rct

advertise any of the sales; it did not solicit bids; and the
publir was not "invited to participate upon a compPti.tiue basis
for the propert:r placed on sale", Pione0r Dodar,
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anrl it unilatPrally determined the credit that was to be given
Respondents.
Appellant claims that the issue of commercial reasonableness
of the disposition of the collateral is a factual issue and not
proper for resolution by sununary judgment.

That claim flies

directly in the face of the undisputed facts set forth above.
Appellant cannot point to even one act on its part which would
fulfill any one of the requirements imposed upon it by the
Conunercial Code in connection with the disposition of the
collateral.

That conclusion is further clearly supported by

Appellant's Supplemental Motion to Vacate Summary Judgment, which
shows the true nature of Appellant's handling of the collateral.
The Trial Court concluded that the "gerrymandering" of the
collateral by Appellant was not to be tolerated and the
undisputed blatant disregard of the obligations imposed upon it
under the Commercial Code were of such a nature as to require the
conclusion that the disposition of the collateral was
commercially unreasonable as a matter of law.

POINT III
THIS COURT MAY AFFIRM A TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
UPON ANY CORRECT BASIS WHETHER OR NOT THAT
BASIS WAS RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT.
In Goodsel v.
1230

of Business Regulations, 523 P.2d

(Utah, 1974), the trial court granted a Summary Judgment and

declared certain portions of the Plumbers Registration and

License Law unconstitutional.

In affirl"inq tho

court's

decision, this Court cited with approval S C.J.S., Appeal and
Error, §1464, and stated:
The appellate court will affirTI' the Judgment, order or
decree appealed from if it is sustainable on anv legal
ground or theor:• <0.pparent on the record, even though
such ground or theory differs from that stated by the
trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action,
and this is true even though such ground or theory is
not urged or argued on appF'a 1 by appe i lee, was r.ot
rc>ised in the lower court, and was not considered or
passed on by the lower court.
Id. at 1232.
Therefore, if the trial court reaches the correct result in
its decision even though there was another basis for it not
relied on by the court below, then the Appellate Court wlll
affirm.
In this case, there are several grounds which will sustain
the Trial Court's decision.

Some are contained in the Pioneer

Dodge, supra, decision, which was referred to by the Trial Court
in its Memorandum Decision.

Other related but independent

grounds exist because of Appellant's failure tn col"nly with the
provisions of the Commercial Code.

Regardless of whnt specific

grounds were relied upnn by the Trial Court, the undisputed facts
appearing in the record when analyzed in conjunction with the
provisions of the Corrmercial Code ard the decisions of this C0urt
clearly show that the Trial Court's
and should be affirmed.
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Judc!"ent was proper

CONCLUSION
ThP evnlutinn of the law as it pertains to deficiency
1udgments 2qainst debtors has reached at least the level that
when there is nn notice to the debtor of the sale of the
collateral and the secured creditor acts in a commercially
unreasonable manner in disposing of the collateral, there can be
no deficiency judgment against the debtor.

That is not to say

that in some cases there may be facts where the failure to notify
the debtor of the sale alone may be sufficient grounds to bar the
deficiency judgment.
The errors and omissions of the Appellant in disposing of
the collateral in question were so grievous and so inconsistent
with the requirement set forth in Pioneer Dodge, supra, and other
related cases, as to allow the Trial Court to conclude, as a
matter of law, that Appellant was not entitled to deficiency
judgment against the Respondents.
The Trial Court's Amended Summary Judgment should be
affirmed in all respects.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

-:::?/

day of August, 1983.
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APPENDIX

EXHIBIT l

IrJ THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

HAGGIS r'1MJAGEMENT, IrJC
a Utah corporation,
Pla1nt1ff.

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO
VACATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

'/S.

TURTLE MANAGEMENT, INC ..
JEOFFREY MEACHAM, STEPHEN
MCCAUGHEY and DAN LEE BRIGGS,

Civil no.

C 80-5763
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---0000000---
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